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position is precarious and uncertain. Further, it requires the applicant to determine what ailment is major and which is minor, a
situation which to one other than a physician would be to a large
extent conjecture. Probably the least desirable result would be
that the applicant would no longer be able to place his confidence
in the agent as he should be able to.
It seems to the writer that the rule under which this state has
brought itself does not recognize the real nature of an insurance
policy. The applicant and the agent are not involved in a bargain
and sale type negotiation in which each party tilts with the other
in order to obtain the advantage. But they are rather in a relationship of confidence as indicated by the language of one of the major
company's advertisements, "Consult your agent as you would your
attorney or physician". The extent to which the applicant may rely
upon the statement of the insurance company's representatives is
not a new question in this state. In 1936 the Supreme Court in the
case of Dickenson v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 117 W. Va. 812,
188 S.E. 378 (1936), posed the following question: "Does the
insured, who relies upon the information and opinion of a company
medical examiner, do so at his peril?" Since the point was not
briefed, the court supplied no answer, but, if driven to its logical
conclusion, the only answer one may discern from this latest
pronouncement would necessarily be in the affirmative.
J. G. V. M.
Acrvrrms As AFFECrING REQUmEUNION'S DUTy TO BARcAwN.-The union, representative
of insurance agents, while negotiating collective agreements with
LABOR LAW-UNROTECGrED
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the employer, sought to bring economic pressure upon the employer
by having its agent-members engage in concerted on-the-job activi-

ties, such as-refusing to solicit new business, reporting late at
offie s, and absenting themselves from special business conferences

arranged by the employer-designed to harass the employer. The
employer charged the union was refusing to bargain collectively;
whereupon the Board entered a cease-and-desist order against the
union. The circuit court set aside this order. On certiorari, the
Court held that the union's duty to bargain collectively in good

faith did not bar it from bringing to bear on the employer harassing
tactics of this nature and that their use by the union was of no

evidentiary significance. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, agreed that
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the finding of bad faith was not supported solely by the showing of
the union's unprotected activities, but would have remanded the
case for reconsideration by the Board, permitting the Board to consider such activities as relevant, but not controlling, evidence of
bad faith bargaining. NLRB v. Insurance Agent Int'l, 80 S.Ct.
419 (1960).
The principal case, more popularly denoted as the Prudential
Insurance case, involved a question concerning a union's duty to
bargain collectively with an employer. This is a statutory requirement of Section 8 (b) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(3) (1952). This
section of the amendment, Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act) was added in 1947 to correspond with Section 8 (5)
of the N.L.R.A. (carred forward by the Taft-Hartley Act as Section 8 (a) (5), supra, which placed a like responsibility upon the
employer.
The original N.L.R.A. contained no test for determination of
what constituted bargaining collectively between the parties. The
Board and the courts, however, defined the obligation by development of the "good faith" rule. E.g., Singer Mfg. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d
181, 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941). With the
adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress expressly defined bargaining collectively as the obligatory duty to bargain in good faith
in regard to wages, hours, and working conditions. § 8(d), supra.
Certain activities, engaged in by unions during contract negotiations to apply economic pressure against the employer, have
been the subject of a recent line of cases prosecuted under Sections
8 (b) (3) and (d) of the Act. Unprotected activities are those types
of economic pressures which are neither protected by falling within
the scope of Section 7 of the Act nor prohibited expressly by any
other provision of the Act. InternationalUnion, UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). When employees engage in such activities, they lose the protection of the
Act and their employer may discharge them and need not rehire
them when the dispute is settled. G. C. Conn v. NLRB, 108 F.2d
390 (7th Cir. 1939). Illustrations of the type of activities or practices objected to are to be found in the examples set out in the
abstract of the principal case, where the agent members" 'Work
Without a Contract Program," in effect a type of slowdown, resulted in the disruption of Prudential business. In Textile Workers

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss4/19

2

H.: Labor Law--Unprotected Activities as Affecting Requirements of Un
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

v. N.L.R.B., 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (the Personal Products
case), the company and union had been deadlocked over negotiations for a new contract. In order to force the employer to come
to terms, the union conducted a series of harassing tactics including
refusal to work overtime, unauthorized extensions of rest periods,
slowdowns, and unannounced recurring walkouts. In United Mine
Workers v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (the Boone
County case), similar activities were engaged in during negotiations.
These cases present the issue whether union members engaged
in unprotected activities during bargaining constitute violations of
Sections 8 (b) (3) and (d) of the Act. That there are at least
three approaches to this problem is evidenced by as many views
set out in the solutions to be herein reviewed.
The first of these approaches, is the "per se' test now written
off by the Courts holding in the Prudentialcase. In 1954, when first
faced with the problem of the use of unprotected activities within
a bargaining context, the Board affirmed the trial examiner in the
PersonalProductscase, supra, finding violations of Sections 8(b) (3)
and (d) of the Act. Textile Workers Union, 108 N.L.R.B. 743
(1954.), enforced in part, set aside in part, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir.
1955). The Board apparently relied heavily upon its prior decision
in Phelps Dodge Copper Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952), where
it was held that similar union activity relieves an employer from his
duty to bargain with the union. However, the Phelps Dodge case
did not hold that such activity constituted absence of good faith
for the purpose of finding a refusal to bargain. The PersonalProduct
decision expanded the concept of good faith by characterizing the
use of the activities as an abuse of the union's bargaining powers
disruptive of the bargaining process Congress intended to protect.
It should be noted that the decision did not explicitly hold that
mere engaging in unprotected activities constituted a per se violation of duty to bargain.
In the second decision, the Boone County case, the trial examiner based his decision primarily on the Personal Products case,
and the Board affirmed, there expressly stated, and apparently for
the first time, that engaging in "an activity unprotected by the Act
. . . occurring in a bargaining context . . . [violates] Section

8(b) (3)" United Mine Workers, 177 N.L.R.B. 1095, 1097 (1957),
rev'd, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This then was the development of the "per se violation" doctrine which bottomed the Board's
decision in the PrudentialInsurance case.
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The same federal circuit court reversed both the Personal
Products and the Boone County cases on this point on the basis
that Congress did not intend for the Board to intrude upon the substance of collective bargaining. This interpretation of the Act had
been previously expounded in probably the best summation to date
of the good faith bargaining concept in a landmark opinion by
Vinson, C. J. N.L.R.B. v. American Nat'l. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395
(1952) (where it was held that employer's bargaining for a management perogative's clause was not per se an unfair labor practice).
To have permitted the Board's intrusion into the bargaining
context by placing prior limitations upon the forms of economic
pressures permissible would have been to place specific objective
tests upon the factor of good faith in each particular case. The
Board's action would have legislated a frame of mind, where actual
response to the proposals of the opposing party would not be
considered, no matter how well intentioned, if the activities were
engaged in. At present, and it is hoped in the future, the test to
,determine whether the parties have bargained collectivly has been
a subjective one gathered from all the factors affecting each case as
it arises. Cox, The Duty to BargainIn Good Faith,71 HAIv. L. REv.
1401, 1440 (1957-58).
Another criticism which may be leveled at the Board's attempt
to regulate conduct of the negotiations by the "per se" test is that
it would create regulation on the basis of relative bargaining power.
This is to say that the steps once taken, the Board would be called
upon time and again to declare the tactics of pressure used by the
stronger party to be unfair merely because they are unprotected
by the Act. This would appear to upset prior decisions which
have left the remedies to the patties, e.g. G. C. Conn v. NLRB,
supra, (where employees were permanently discharged for engaging
in unprotected activities), and those left to the enforcemnt of state
courts, e.g. Allen Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 815 U.S. 740 (1942) (where it was held that Congress
left open the control of labor violence to the states). It is apparent
that the court in the PrudentialInsurance case based its repudiation
of the "per se" doctrine in part to correspond to prior decisions in
the area national-state jurisdiction. The court also recognized that
even though brute force alone has given way to more sophisticated
bargaining forms, the results of negotiations still are governed by
the principle that power begets the substance of the settlement.
To force a departure from the prevailing mode before the parties

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss4/19

4

H.: Labor Law--Unprotected Activities as Affecting Requirements of Un
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
have developed a substitute for the interplay of economic pressures,
would only sound the clarion call for increased government intervention in this narrow area heretofore preserved to the parties.
'The second approach to harassing tactics and their relation
to the good faith bargaining requirement was just the opposite of the
"per se" test and held that the use of such tactics had no probative
relevance on a charge of refusal to bargain in good faith. In reversing
the Board the circuit court in the PersonalProducts and the Boone
County cases held that unprotected activities used in the bargaining concept did not raise the slightest inference of refusal by a
union to bargain in good faith.
'I'he Supreme Court in Prudential states that, "...
the two
factors-necessity for good faith bargaining.. ., and the availability
of economic pressure devices to make the other party incline to
agree . .. -exist side by side .. "
]In view of present policies the truth of this statement cannot
be denied. However, to hold that the use of such activities is of
no evidentiary significance and cannot be weighed by the Board
is to reduce the requirement to bargain collectively in good faith
to a sterile concept. It may be termed sterile because duty of "good
faith" is limited by this holding only to occurrences at the bargaining
table. The spirit of the Court's decision is to be praised for reversing
the trend adopted by the Board which would have placed the NLRB
in a third seat at the bargaining table, but it may be questioned
whether its application as a general rule would produce the desired
result in practice. For example, it is foreseeable that threats of
violence by the union, e.g. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 335 U.S. 131
(1957), or the retaliation of the employer by lockout during negotiations to force a settlement, e.g. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local,
353 U.S. 87 (1957), could be certainly indicative of merely going
through the motions of bargaining while entertaining no intention
of agreement.
'The third approach, expressed in the concurring opinion of the
Prudential case, was that all activities occurring within the bargaining context are inferential to the determination of good faith.
This is characterized as the "totality-of-conduct" view. Section
10(e) of the Act provides that, "The findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, while expressing his concurrence that the "per se" doc-
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trine should be rejected, also takes issue with the Court's holding
that unprotected activities should be of no evidentiary significance
in the determination of bargaining collectively in good faith. He
would remand to the Board for opportunity to introduce further
evidence to support the charge of bargaining in bad faith. Such an
approach would permit all factors within the bargaining context
to be weighed by the trier of fact.
In each of the three cases herein reviewed there was no suggestion by the company that the union refused to negotiate. It was
contended, however, in each that the extraneous acts evidenced a
desire not to bargain in good faith. Only the Board, in each instance
urged that the parties must, while in the bargaining context, in
their every contact engage in fair dealings with the other. There
is some basis to this argument. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 851
U.S. 149 (1956) (where the per se doctrine was applied to an
employer). But the Truitt case is distinguishable in that the acts
complained of related to occurrences at the bargaining table concerning one of the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
that is, wages.
In sharp contrast to the Board's holding is the majority opinion
in the principal case. The Court held the activities to be of no
probative relevance. This decision appears to negative even the
possibility that such unprotected acts evidence a lack of faith. Since
1943, the bargainor's subjective state of mind has been tested by
applying the criterion of how an ordinary prudent man who sincerely
desires to make an effort to bargain with the certified representative
would act. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 183 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1943). Such a conclusion revealing a state of mind must necessarily be supported by inferences drawn from both external occurrences surrounding the bargaining as well as those evidenced at
the bargaining table. Cf., Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB, 840
U.S. 474 (1957). The majority decision in the Prudentialcase, therefore, appears to go too far in the other direction in that it precludes
the Board, which was vested by the Act as the trier of fact, from
utilizing the presence of factors that should influence its decision.
So while the Board would legislate an undue expansion of its powers,
it appears, in like measure, that the Court has substituted its own
judgment for Congress' and effected a contraction of the Board's
power. Justice Frankfurter appears to have expressed the more
reasonable holding which is more in line with the historical definition of good faith. Although in accord with the majority that the
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subjective interpretation of good faith be preserved, he also would
permit the Board to continue to utilize all relevant acts by the parties
as inferences of good faith, or the lack of it, in bargaining.
C. H. H., II
TRIA-UNTrEDED CouRTOOM INFLUENCE-WHEN NEW TmiAL

WARmANn.-In the trial of an action under the Federal Employers'

Liability Act by an employee against the railroad for the loss of an
eye suffered in the course of employment, a blind man, carrying a
cane and a cigar box, entered the courtroom near the close of D's
case, and took a seat immediately behind one in which P was seated.
The blind man entered the courtroom of his own volition and was
not intentionally brought there for the purpose of influencing the
jury's verdict. Held, reversing judgment for P and remanding the
case for retrial, that in order to warrant a new trial it is not necessary that such courtroom episodes be deliberately contrived for the
purpose of creating sympathy for P or prejudice towards D, nor is it
necessary that it be conclusively shown that members of the jury
were actually influenced thereby. Fitzpatrick v. St. Louis-San
FranciscoRy., 327 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1959).
A "fair triar" contemplates that no outside influences shall be
brought to bear upon the jury and that no evidence shall be considered by it other than that presented and admitted at trial. Hinton
v. Gallagher, 190 Va. 421, 57 S.E.2d 131 (1950).
Where extrinsic factors are present, the effect of which may be
to affect unduly the course of the jury's deliberation, the courts have
acknowledged the wholly subjective nature of the problem and
have granted considerable latitude to the discretion of the trial
judge to control the incidents of the trial and his sound exercise
thereof will not be disturbed unless clearly abused. Boecking
Constr. Co. v. Callen, 321 P.2d 970 (Okla. 1958); Plank v. Summers,
203 Md. 598, 102 A.2d 262 (1954).
The courts have often been confronted with a dilemma in such
circumstances in weighing the importance of the factors surrounding the prejudicial incident. Where the jury has been influenced by
irrelevant events, injustice may result from allowing the verdict to
stand, but, conversely, a miscarriage of justice to the successful
party may result from setting aside the verdict. The latter is
especially true where the reprehensible act was without the knowledge or beyond the control of the prevailing party in the action.
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